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“The Internet is the first thing that humanity has built that humanity doesn’t
understand, the largest experiment in anarchy we’ve ever had.” – Eric Schmidt,
Former Executive Chairman of Google1
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the first recognizable social network site launched in 1997, social
networking sites have rapidly grown in popularity worldwide. 2 Social networking
sites allow individuals to construct a profile within a system, share a connection
with other users, and view others’ connections. 3 Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
Snapchat, and Tumblr are among the most popular sites for teenagers. 4 71
percent of teens report using two or more of these social media sites. 5 The
popularity of social networking sites and daily Internet usage has led the United
States Supreme Court to state, “the most important place (in a spatial sense) for
the exchange of views . . . is cyberspace.”6
The FBI describes social media’s prominence among teens as a “recipe for
trouble with naïve teenagers, predatory adults, and a medium—the Internet—that
easily connects them.”7 Protecting children from online predation is a real
problem because there are nearly half a million online pedophiles. 8 The FBI’s
2017 Internet Crime Report noted social media sites were the medium to
facilitate almost 20,000 cybercrimes, including over 15,000 “Confidence

1. Jerome Taylor, Google Chief: My Fears for Generation Facebook, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 18, 2010,
12:00 AM), available at https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-chief-myfears-for-generation-facebook-2055390.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. OF
COMPUTER -MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211–17 (2008) (explaining that SixDegrees.com was the first social
network site when it launched in 1997).
3. Id. at 211.
4. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015: Smartphone Facilitate Shifts in
Communication Landscape for Teens, PEW RES. CTR. 25 (Apr. 9, 2015), available) at
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2015/04/PI_TeensandTech_Update2015_0409151.pdf
(on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).
5. Id.
6. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
7.
FBI, Child Predators: The Online Threat Continues to Grow (May 17, 2011),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/child-predators (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Id.
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Fraud/Romance” crimes and 1,300 “Crimes Against Children.” 9
The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children’s (NCMEC)
“CyberTipline” received 10.2 million reports of suspected child sexual
exploitation in 2017 alone. 10 Of approximately 6,000 reports of “online
enticement” across different social media and messaging applications, the most
common methods offenders used to entice children included engaging in sexual
conversation, asking children for sexually explicit images of themselves, and
discussing interests or “liking” the child’s online posts to develop a rapport with
the child. 11
To protect against enticement and other online predation, Facebook and
MySpace banned registered sex offenders from their sites in 2009. 12
Additionally, Facebook’s terms of service prohibit registered sex offenders from
signing up for Facebook.13 Although Facebook’s terms of service prohibit
registered sex offenders from signing up, a registered sex offender can create an
account by using an alias.14 Since registered sex offenders can still access and use
social media sites, like Facebook, states, such as North Carolina, enacted
criminal statutes prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing
“commercial social networking website[s]” to additionally deter and prevent
online predation. 15
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
the North Carolina statute and found the language defining social media sites was
overbroad and an unjustified encroachment on sex offender’s free speech rights
that was not narrowly tailored to serve governmental interests.16 Laws like North
Carolina’s would bar access to a broad range of websites everyone uses daily for
communication, news, and self-identity. 17
The United States Supreme Court recognized child sexual abuse as “a most

9. FBI INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., I NTERNET CRIME REPORT 20 (2017), available at
https://pdf.ic3.gov/2017_IC3Report.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
10.
NAT’L
C TR.
FOR
MISSING
&
EXPLOITED
CHILD.,
Online
Enticement
http://www.missingkids.com/theissues/onlineenticement (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
11. Id.
12.
Facebook, MySpace Ban New York Sex Offenders, PHYS ORG. (Dec. 1, 2009),
https://phys.org/news/2009-12-facebook-myspace-york-sex.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
13. Facebook, Terms of Service, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1734 (2017) (explaining how Lester Gerard
Packingham, a registered sex offender, posted on Facebook with an account named “J.R. Gerrard” in violation
of North Carolina’s ban on registered sex offenders accessing social networking sites).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
16. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
17. See id. (“North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal sources
for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square,
and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”).
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serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people.” 18
Despite the compelling interest in protecting children, perpetrators of child
sexual abuse still have a right to freedom of speech: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”19 The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause applies to the states
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 Accordingly, both
the federal government and states cannot infringe on sex offenders’ constitutional
rights when enacting statutes that prohibit sex offenders from using social
media.21
Registered sex offenders and other marginalized groups, like prisoners,
maintain their constitutional rights. 22 Laws such as the one in Packingham apply
after sex offenders pay their debts to society. 23 While registered sex offenders
may have constitutional protections, they must deal with the “shame, exclusion,
and stigmatization” of being a sexual predator.24 Sex offenders must register as
“legally recognized sex offenders” with local law enforcement, then law
enforcement releases an offender’s personal information to the public; failing to
register is a crime. 25 Additionally, sex offenders have trouble finding housing,
getting jobs, and maintaining personal relationships because of their past. 26
Therefore, while sex offenders keep their constitutional rights upon registering,
18. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733.
21. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (“[T]he State may not enact this complete bar to the exercise of
the First Amendment rights on websites integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.”).
22. See State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 579–80 (R.I. 2009) (describing the appellant, a registered sex
offender, was able to present a multifaceted case in the Superior Court, consistent with his constitutional right to
due process); see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 508 (2005) (explaining prisoners have equal
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to bolster legitimacy of criminal justice system).
23. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (applying the prohibition to sex offenders after they register according
to state registry law) (emphasis added).
24. Carla Schultz, The Stigmatization of Individuals Convicted of Sex Offenses: Labeling Theory and The
Sex Offense Registry, 2 THEMIS: RES. J. OF JUST. STUD. & FORENSIC SCI., Art. 4, 67 (2014) available at
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol2/iss1/4 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. Id. at 67–68; Douglas Evans, Michelle Cubellis, Coping with Stigma: How Registered Sex Offenders
Manage Their Public Identities, AM. J. CRIM. JUST., 593, 594 (2015) available at
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs12103-014-9277-z.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
26. See Evans & Cubellis, supra note 25 (noting residency restrictions and other prohibitions that affect
lives of registered sex offenders); see also James Wagner, Luke Heimlich Signs with Mexican Team, but Could
Be Blocked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/sports/luke-heimlich-mexicobaseball-league.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing how Major League
Baseball, the Chinese Professional Baseball League, and possibly the Mexican Baseball League have shunned
Luke Heimlich, a top college pitching prospect, because he pled guilty to sexually molesting his six-year-old
niece when he was fifteen).
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they retain mostly limited rights. 27
Laws prohibiting sex offenders from accessing social media sites, like the
one in Packingham, deprive registered sex offenders of their First Amendment
rights.28 Such laws only comply with the First Amendment if the government
proves they are “narrowly-tailored” to serve compelling state interests.29
Prohibiting sex offenders from using social media undoubtedly serves the
compelling governmental interest of protecting children. 30 The issue, to avoid
infringing First Amendment rights, is narrowly tailoring the meaning of social
media and the speech activities a law prohibits. 31
This Comment proposes a narrowly-tailored definition of “social media” for
use in drafting a model statute that serves the government’s compelling purpose
of protecting children from online sexual predation without encroaching on sex
offenders’ First Amendment rights.32 Part II analyzes the United States Supreme
Court’s Packingham v. North Carolina decision, the First Amendment issues the
Court discussed, and the case’s implications for social media restrictions on sex
offenders.33 While the Packingham opinion discusses activities that legislatures
could prohibit, this Comment only addresses narrowly defining “social media” to
meet appropriate First Amendment scrutiny.34 Part III develops the narrowlytailored definition of social media based on fundamental characteristics of social
media, legislative definitions, and judicial opinions post-Packingham.35 Next,
Part IV examines prohibited locations to sex offenders and their cyberspace
equivalents.36 Finally, Part V discusses how to restrict these “digital
playgrounds” without infringing on First Amendment rights with a narrowlytailored definition of social media.37
27. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (noting—while not at issue in the
case—laws such as Section 14-202.5 impose severe restrictions on people who have already served their
sentence and are not subject to criminal justice supervision); see also Schultz, supra note 24, at 70–74
(describing difficulties registered sex offenders face when trying to find housing, psychological impact of being
a registered sex offender, and public perception of sex offenders).
28. See Ilya Shapiro, Even Sex Offenders Have Constitutional Rights, CATO INST. (JUNE 22, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/blog/even-sex-offenders-have-constitutional-rights (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing how the North Carolina statute in Packingham unconstitutionally violated sex
offenders’ First Amendment rights).
29. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
30. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244–45 (2002) (“The sexual abuse of a child is a
most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people. . . [legislatures] may pass
valid laws to protect children from abuse.”).
31. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
32. Infra Part III.
33. Infra Part II.
34. Infra Part III; Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“[I]t can be assumed that
the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from
engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather
information about a minor.”).
35. Infra Part III.
36. Infra Part IV.
37. Infra Part V.
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II. PACKINGHAM V. NORTH CAROLINA: THE SUPREME COURT’S FIRST LOOK AT
SOCIAL MEDIA
In 2017, the United States Supreme Court decided “one of the first [cases] to
address the relationship between the First Amendment and the modern
Internet.”38 Subsection A discusses the facts and the case’s procedural history
before the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.39 Subsection B
discusses the Supreme Court’s analysis of First Amendment concerns such as the
level of scrutiny and narrow tailoring. 40
A. Lester Packingham versus J.R. Gerard and Procedural History
In 2002, Lester Gerard Packingham—a 21-year-old college student—pled
guilty to “taking indecent liberties” with a child after having sex with a 13-yearold girl. 41 North Carolina law required Packingham to register as a sex offender,
a label which endures for at least 30 years.42 North Carolina enacted Section 14202.5 in 2008,43 which made registered sex offenders accessing a “commercial
social networking web site”—where the sex offender knew minors could join—a
felony crime. 44
A member of the Durham Police Department was investigating potential
Section 14-202.5 violations and noticed a Facebook post from a “J.R. Gerrard.” 45
The post read: “Man God is Good! How about I got so much favor they
dismissed the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing
spent...... Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thanks JESUS!”46 The officer discovered
the post coincided with court records dismissing a ticket against Lester
Packingham, a registered sex offender. 47 Evidence later confirmed the officer’s
suspicions that “J.R. Gerrard” was Lester Packingham; a grand jury later indicted
Packingham for violating Section 14-202.5.48
The trial court denied Packingham’s constitutional challenges to Section 14202.5, and the jury found Packingham guilty. 49 The North Carolina Court of
38. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
39. Infra Section II.A.
40. Infra Section II.B.
41. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734.
42. Id.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a), (e) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
44. Id.
45. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. State v. Packingham, 229 N.C. App. 293, 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d, 777 S.E.2d 738 (2015),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016), and rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
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Appeals vacated the conviction and concluded that Section 14-202.5 was
unconstitutional on its face and as applied. 50 The Court of Appeals concluded the
statute was a content-neutral “time, place, and manner” restriction subject to
intermediate scrutiny, and Section 14-202.5 was not narrowly-tailored to serve
“significant” governmental interests. 51
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that Section 14202.5 was constitutional because Packingham had “numerous alternatives that
provide the same or similar services” as websites that Section 14-202.5 forbade. 52
The North Carolina Supreme Court additionally found the statute constitutional
as applied to Packingham based on particular facts.53 The court reasoned that
Packingham signed a written notice of websites he could not access, and he had
used an alias to set up his Facebook account: “indicating his awareness that he
was indulging in forbidden behavior.”54
B. Supreme Court Opinion: Justice Kennedy
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court unanimously
agreed that Section 14-202.5 was unconstitutionally broad and not “narrowly
tailored” to satisfy the First Amendment. 55 The Court did not determine whether
the statute was a content-neutral or content-based restriction on speech.56 The
North Carolina Supreme Court had determined the statute was content-neutral,
even in light of the United States Supreme Court’s Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.
decision.57 Again, the United States Supreme Court did not determine the level of
scrutiny—the Court assumed the statute was content-neutral and subject to
intermediate scrutiny—and determined its social media definition was
unconstitutionally overbroad and not narrowly-tailored to serve the government’s
significant interest.58
50. Id. at 304.
51. Id. at 296–97.
52. State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 747 (2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016), and rev’d,
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
53. Id. at 749.
54. Id.
55. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); 137 S. Ct. at 1739 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
56. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
57. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 744–45 (“Although Reed focused on the interpretation of content-based
regulations of speech, while we concluded above that section 14–202.5 is a regulation of conduct, even under a
Reed analysis we see that section 14–202.5 is a content-neutral regulation.”) (emphasis in original); but see
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015) (“Because ‘[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of
the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content,’ we have insisted that ‘laws favoring some
speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content
preference.’”) (internal citations omitted).
58. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (2017); see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Com’n, 572 U.S. 185, 199
(2014) (concluding that trying to determine which standard applies, content-based or content-neutral, is
unnecessary if a statute would fail the less demanding test).
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The statute was unconstitutional because “with one broad stroke” it
prohibited access to “principal sources for knowing current events” and other
websites that allow a person to “make his or her voice heard.”59 The Court
interpreted the statute to completely prohibit merely accessing social networking
sites “as commonly understood” like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, but also
websites such as Amazon and WebMD.60 The impact of such a broad statute is it
“burdens more speech than necessary” to further the government’s purpose in
protecting children and encroaches on an individual’s First Amendment rights. 61
The Court did not address the issue, but severe prohibitions to access to vast
realms of the Internet after serving sentences troubled the Court. 62
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion recognized that society does not fully
understand the Internet’s potential and ever-changing nature: “The forces and
directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far-reaching that courts
must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.” 63
Justice Kennedy noted the Court must be cautious before suggesting the First
Amendment gives little protection for accessing certain sections of the Internet. 64
However, Justice Kennedy clarified the Court’s decision “should not be
interpreted as barring a State from enacting more specific laws than the one at
issue.”65 A state could have a law with a narrowly-tailored definition of social
media that “prohibit[s] a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often
presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather
information about a minor,” which would fit within the First Amendment’s
framework.66
Following Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, legislatures can enact statutes that
narrowly define social media to exclude certain non-social websites, limiting
permissible activities on those sites. 67 The Packingham Court invalidated North
Carolina’s statute for overbroadly defining social media under the less rigid
intermediate scrutiny standard.68 Additionally, a model statute would need to
narrowly state prohibited activities beyond “access” as North Carolina did;

59. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
60. Id. at 1736–37.
61. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 464 (2015) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
799 (1989).
62. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (“Of importance, the troubling fact that the law imposes severe
restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of
the criminal justice system.”) (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 1736.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1737.
66. Id.
67. Id. (“[I]t can be assumed that the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly
tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like
contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor.”).
68. Id. at 1737.
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however, this Comment only focuses on defining social media narrowly. 69
III. NARROWLY DEFINING SOCIAL MEDIA
Government regulation of speech is subject to heightened scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause if a law is content-based.70 A law is content-based if it targets
“the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. . . [and] ‘on its face’ draws
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” 71 Additionally, a law
preferring certain speakers is content-based when the reason for the preference is
the speech’s content.72 Under Reed, a law prohibiting registered sex offenders
from using social media would be content-based because it allows non-offenders
to use social media, but prohibits sex offenders because of offenders’ potential to
send predatory messages.73 Since a law prohibiting registered sex offenders from
social media is content-based, it must pass strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.74
Under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the restriction “furthers
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”75 The
United States Supreme Court recognized protecting children from sexual assault
is a compelling interest.76 The Court also recognized that the First Amendment
permits enacting laws restricting sex offenders on social media if the law is

69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (“It is unlawful for a sex offender who is registered [under North
Carolina law] to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site
permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages on the commercial
social networking Web site.”) (emphasis added); see also Vangie Beal, Access Definition, Webopedia (2019),
https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/A/access.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(defining “access” as simply visiting a website).
70. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (stating content-based laws are subject to
strict scrutiny); see also Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (assuming the law at issue was content neutral and
applying intermediate scrutiny).
71. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (2015) (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564–65 (2011)).
72. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (2015) (“Because ‘[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker
are all too often simply a means to control content,’ we have insisted that ‘laws favoring some speakers over
others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content preference.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
73. Id. at 2230; see Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (2017) (“[I]t can be assumed that the First
Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging
in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information
about a minor.”); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., Online Enticement
http://www.missingkids.com/theissues/onlineexploitation/online-enticement (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the most common methods offenders used to entice
children online were engaging in sexual conversation, asking children for sexually explicit images of
themselves, and developing a rapport with the child by discussing interests or “liking” the child’s online posts).
74. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228.
75. Id. at 2231 (quoting Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)) (emphasis
added).
76. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (“[T]he . . . interest [of]
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is a compelling one.”).
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narrowly-tailored.77 Strict and intermediate scrutiny require a narrowly-tailored
law that serves the government’s interest, but the meaning of narrow tailoring is
not the same for both levels of scrutiny. 78
The Packingham Court assumed the statute was content-neutral and applied
intermediate scrutiny. 79 In determining if a law “abridging the freedom of
speech”80 is content-neutral, the principal inquiry is whether the “government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys.”81 Government regulation of expressive activity is “content neutral” so
long as “[the regulation] is ‘justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.’”82 A content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation must
pass intermediate scrutiny.83 To pass intermediate scrutiny, a law must be
narrowly tailored to further a significant governmental purpose without
substantially burdening more speech than necessary. 84 The restriction does not
have to be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the
government’s interest; meaning, the restriction leaves open adequate alternate
channels for expression.85 The statute in Packingham failed “intermediate
scrutiny” because the statute was too broad to serve its preventative purpose. 86
The statute’s definition of social media and social networking sites was a
“complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites integral to
the fabric of our modern society and culture.” 87
Alternatively, a “content-based” restriction is based on the substance of the
speaker’s message.88 A content-based restriction must pass strict scrutiny because
it “raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or

77. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (2017) (“[I]t can be assumed that the First Amendment permits a
State to enact specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often
presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor.”).
78. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486, 2535 (2015) (“For a content-neutral time, place, or
manner regulation to be narrowly tailored, it must not ‘burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further the government’s legitimate interests’ . . . unlike a content-based restriction of speech, [the law] ‘need
not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the government’s interests.”) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989)).
79. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (2017); see McCutcheon v. Federal Election Com’n, 572 U.S. 185,
199 (2014) (concluding that trying to determine which standard applies, content-based or content-neutral, is
unnecessary if a statute would fail the less demanding test).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis added).
82. Id. (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis
added in Ward)).
83. McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486.
84. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (emphasis added).
85. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
86. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
87. Id. at 1738.
88. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 115
(1991).

132

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
viewpoints from the marketplace.” 89 Intermediate and strict scrutiny require
“narrowly tailored” laws, but strict scrutiny requires the law to be narrowlytailored to serve a compelling governmental purpose. 90 To satisfy narrow
tailoring under strict scrutiny, the government must prove an “actual problem”
needs solving, that the narrowly-tailored law is not overbroad, not
underinclusive, and there are no alternate means. 91
Protecting children from online predation is a real problem. 92 Given the
Internet’s vast range, underinclusivity is not a significant concern for laws
restricting sex offenders on social media. 93 Alternative means of preventing
online predation are not the focus of this Comment, but there are no available
alternatives because sites, like Facebook, state in their Terms and Conditions that
users cannot be registered sex offenders, yet registered sex offenders are still able
to access and use these websites. 94
The remainder of this section will develop a narrowly-tailored definition of
social media that is not overbroad, which requires understanding the social media
landscape.95 Subsection A examines the fundamental aspects of social media and
social networking sites.96 Subsection B analyzes different state legislative
definitions of social media and how those legislative definitions align or differ
from the social science definition.97 Finally, subsection C discusses how cases
and legislative changes post-Packingham have influenced social media
definitions.98
A. Most Common Characteristics of Social Media
One of the biggest challenges with defining social media is that “the
technologies that make social media possible are flexible, general-purpose

89. Id.
90. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (emphasis added).
91. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. at 813; Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015).
92.
NAT’L
C TR.
FOR
MISSING
&
EXPLOITED
CHILD.,
Online
Enticement
http://www.missingkids.com/theissues/onlineexploitation/online-enticement (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
93. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“[T]he most important [place] for the
exchange of views. . . is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet.’”) (quoting Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
94. Facebook, Terms of Service, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734 (explaining how Lester
Gerard Packingham, a registered sex offender, posted on Facebook with an account named “J.R. Gerrard” in
violation of North Carolina’s ban on registered sex offenders gaining access to social networking sites).
95. Jan Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the Functional Building Blocks of
Social Media, 54 BUS. H ORIZONS 241, 241–42 (2011) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
96. Infra Section III.A.
97. Infra Section III.B.
98. Infra Section III.C.
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technologies that can support many different types of social media services.” 99
Defining social media is especially difficult for judges and legislators where
“errors of understanding by these scientific laymen, though honest, have been
mammoth.”100 The biggest error with defining social media is failing to
understand the character of technology and trying to use existing regulatory
schemes with evolving technologies. 101
To avoid further misunderstanding, the first step in defining social media is
to comprehend the fundamentals of social media. 102 Social media has changed the
communication landscape with churches, governors, and local businesses using
different types of social media to interact with others. 103 While social media sites
differ in content and approach, most cites share functional “building blocks:”
identity, conversation, sharing, presence, relationships, reputation, and groups. 104
Additionally, four commonalities among different social media sites exist: 1)
Web 2.0 Internet-based applications; 2) fueled by user-generated content; 3)
individuals and users create and maintain user-specific profiles for the
site/application; and 4) social media facilitates the development of social
networks by connecting a profile with others.105 A narrowly-tailored definition of
social media would consider these commonalities and social media’s functional
building blocks.106
Today’s major social media platforms concentrate on balancing three or four
primary features instead of focusing on a single one. 107 Not all of the
characteristics need to be present to be “social media,” nor are the fundamental
aspects of social media mutually exclusive. 108 The following sections explain
how various social media sites illustrate the fundamental building blocks and
commonalities, but knowing individual sites and their features is not necessary to

99. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 749 (2015) (internal citations omitted) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
100. Id. at 748.
101. Id. at 747–48.
102. Jan Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the Functional Building Blocks of
Social Media, 54 BUS. H ORIZONS 241, 242 (2011) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
103. Id. at 241; see Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (explaining social
media’s prevalence in society with governors in all 50 states and almost all members of Congress having
Twitter accounts to allow users to engage directly with their elected representatives).
104. Kietzmann, supra note 102, at 242–43.
105. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 746–47 (2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
106. Id.; see generally Danah Boyd & Nicole Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. OF COMPUTER -MEDIATED COMM., 210, 211 (2008) (defining the four basic commonalities of
social media).
107. Kietzmann, supra note 102, at 249.
108. Id. at 243.
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draft a narrow definition of social media.109
1. SixDegrees and Facebook: Relationships and Networking
In 1997, SixDegrees.com was the first social networking site to combine
numerous features by allowing users to create profiles, list their friends, and let
users examine others’ friends lists. 110 Facebook, which has over 2 billion users
since its 2004 launch,111 builds around establishing an “identity” where users
create individual profiles with pictures or listing hobbies. 112 Facebook’s other
main building block is “relationships,” which includes affiliating one user with
others based on existing connections. 113
2. Twitter: User-Generated Conversations and Reputation Building
Twitter is more concerned with conversation than identity. 114 Twitter users
exchange short messages, called “tweets,” that are essentially real-time status
updates to their followers.115 Relationships and identity are less important and are
more informal on Twitter compared to Facebook.116 Twitter users have
“followers,” not “friends” like Facebook. 117 “Followers,” are more indicators of
popularity and reputation than a way to form relationships or to determine how
many people read their “tweets.” 118
3. LinkedIn: Professional Relationships and Identity
LinkedIn, “the business-oriented networking site,”119 predominately focuses
on users building an individual reputation and forming relationships to develop a
professional network. 120 Like Facebook, LinkedIn also focuses on relationships

109. Infra Section III.A.1–5.
110. Boyd & Ellison, supra note 106, at 214.
111. Kathleen Chayowski, Mark Zuckerberg: 2 Billion Users Means Facebook’s ‘Responsibility Is
Expanding,’
FORBES
(June
27,
2017,
1:37
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2017/06/27/facebook-officially-hits-2-billionusers/#5bf7e7173708 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
112. Kietzmann, supra note 102, at 243–44.
113. Id. at 246.
114. Id. at 244.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 246.
117. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 745, 747 (2015).
118. Kietzmann, supra note 102, at 247.
119. Nicholas Lemann, The Network Man: Reid Hoffman’s Big Idea, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 2015,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/12/the-network-man (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
120. Kietzmann, supra note 102, at 246.
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among users.121 Users create an identity based on prior work and education
experiences to form relationships among their network and create a reputation to
further their careers.122
4. YouTube: Sharing and Going Viral
YouTube, another of the most popular social media sites, shows the
importance of social media’s “sharing” characteristics to facilitate social
interaction or establish a reputation. 123 YouTube allows users to share videos
with the world, but the users do not need to form relationships with viewers. 124
YouTube users can garner a reputation for posting “viral” videos that accumulate
numerous views and positive ratings; views and ratings are the equivalent to
Facebook “likes” in terms of building a reputation. 125 The ability to gain a
reputation through simply posting a public video launched some to music
stardom, and allowed others to become “YouTubers” and make a living by
streaming content to subscribers.126
5. New-Age Social Media: Instagram and Snapchat
While social media services like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn remain the
most popular, newer social media platforms such as Instagram and Snapchat have
gained popularity among teens while still featuring many of the foundational
components of social media.127 Instagram launched in 2010 and operates like
Facebook and Twitter.128 Instagram users connect with one another and post
pictures to establish an identity based on photographs of hobbies or interests. 129

121. Id.
122. Id. at 245.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 245–46.
125. Id. at 247.
126. See Isis Briones, 12 Major Artists Who Got Their Starts on YouTube, TEEN VOGUE (Mar. 29, 2016,
4:22 PM), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/best-artists-discovered-on-youtube (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how 12 major artists, including Grammy winning and international icons
such as Justin Bieber, The Weeknd, and Ed Sheeran, started their careers posting videos to YouTube); see also
Laura Parker, A Chat With a Live Streamer Is Yours, for a Price, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/technology/personaltech/paying-for-live-stream-chat.html (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing how YouTube and Twitch streamers can get paid for
streaming themselves playing video games).
127. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 746 (2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (explaining these new social media sites are popular among teens because parents are less
likely to join or create accounts for these sites).
128. Id. at 747.
129.
Stephanie Buck, The Beginner’s Guide to Instagram, Mashable (May 29, 2012),
https://mashable.com/2012/05/29/instagram-for-beginners/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
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Users can also follow pages and hashtags—similar to liking Facebook pages—
and post content a user may identify with. 130 Like Twitter, Instagram users can
follow one another instead of being “friends” and can post instantaneous content,
but in the form of pictures with different filters as opposed to tweets. 131
Additionally, users can gain likes for their photos similar to Facebook,132 and can
further establish a reputation based on the number of followers they have, like
Twitter.133
Comparable to Facebook, Snapchat users can add “friends” or create groups
to share and send “snaps”—temporary text or picture messages between one
another—or, users can share a snap on their “story” that remains visible to their
friends for 24 hours.134 Additionally, users can establish a reputation with a high
“snap score,” indicating the number of snaps sent and received; thus, indicating
popularity similar to YouTube views or Facebook likes.135
The foundational building blocks of social media are also present within the
commonalities.136 Sites like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter are Web
2.0 applications where users consume the media and can use the application to
create content and interact with others. 137 User-generated content—tweets, snaps,
status updates, photos and likes on Instagram, YouTube videos, or blog posts—
builds on the idea that social media sites are Web 2.0 applications.138 These
various forms of user-generated content go toward social media’s primary
building blocks—identity, reputation, sharing, relationships, etc.—and are part of
the fourth commonality: that social media facilitate and develop social
networks.139 The building blocks and commonalities are both still prevalent in
Review).
130. See Jan Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the Functional Building
Blocks of Social Media, 54 BUS. HORIZONS 241, 245 (2011) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (explaining an implication of the “sharing” block of social media is that users can evaluate what they
have in common, then identify new objects to mediate their shared interests).
131. Obar & Wildman, supra note 127.
132. Kietzmann, supra note 130, at 247.
133. Id.
134. Pia Ceres, How to Use Snapchat: Critical Tips for New Users, WIRED, (Oct. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-use-snapchat-filters-stories-stickers/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
135. Briallyn Smith, How Does the Snapchat Score Work and How to Get Your Points up, MAKE USE OF
(Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/improve-snapchat-score/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
136. Kietzmann, supra note 130, at 243; Obar & Wildman, supra note 127, at 746–47.
137. Obar & Wildman, supra note 127, at 746; see Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, O’REILLY (Sep. 30,
2005), https://www.oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“One other feature of Web 2.0 that deserves mention is the fact that it’s no longer limited
to the PC platform. In his parting advice to Microsoft, long time Microsoft developer Dave Stutz pointed out
that ‘Useful software written above the level of the single device will command high margins for a long time to
come.’”).
138. See Obar & Wildman, supra note 127 (explaining various forms of user-generated content that is
the “lifeblood” of social media).
139. Id. at 747; Kietzmann, supra note 130.
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social media.140
The functional building blocks and commonalities of social media are
present within one another and are what distinguish social media from other
technology that may do the same basic functions. 141 A model definition of social
media must determine the scope of social media to include sites with the
functional building blocks and commonalities, but exclude sites without these
traits, or sites not primarily for socialization.142
B. Different State Definitions of Social Media
The next step for narrowly tailoring the meaning of social media for a model
statute is examining how state legislatures define the term. 143 Despite the
fundamental characteristics of social media, states vary greatly in how they
define social media with no settled “legal” definition of social media. 144
Subsection 1 discusses the Supreme Court’s analysis of where the North Carolina
statute failed First Amendment scrutiny. 145 Subsection 2 examines other state
definitions of social media to develop a definition for the model statute within
North Carolina’s framework that is not overbroad. 146
1. North Carolina’s Social Media Ban
The United States Supreme Court held, under less-exacting scrutiny, North
Carolina’s statute aiming to protect sex offenders from accessing social media
sites over broadly defined social media; therefore, the law was not narrowlytailored to serve a substantial governmental purpose. 147 North Carolina defined a
“commercial social networking Web site” as an Internet website meeting the
following requirements:
140. See generally Kietzmann, supra note 130 (laying out the functional building blocks of social
media); Obar & Wildman, supra note 127, at 746–47 (illustrating the four commonalities of social media
services).
141. Obar & Wildman, supra note 127, at 746.
142. See id. (reasoning that social media is incredibly broad, so simply saying social media are
technologies that facilitate communication and collaboration, and bring people together could incorrectly
include technologies like telephones, fax machines, and e-mail as social media).
143. Eric Goldman, What’s the Legal Definition of a “Social Media Site”? Uh. . . (People v. Lopez),
TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 27, 2016), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/01/whats-the-legaldefinition-of-a-social-media-site-uh-people-v-lopez.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (reasoning North Carolina’s
statute prohibiting sex offenders from using social media defined social media too broadly).
144. Goldman, supra note 143.
145. Infra Section III.B.1
146. Infra Section III.B.2; North Carolina’s statutory framework is serving as the basis for the model
statute because it is the most expansive in terms of what it includes as social media and allows the model statute
to right its wrongs based on the Supreme Court’s analysis and examining other state definitions.
147. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
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(1) [Operated] by a person who derives revenue from membership fees,
advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the [website].
(2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the
purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges.
(3) Allows users to create [webpages] or personal profiles that contain
information such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on the
personal [webpage] by the user, other personal information about the user, and
links to other personal [webpages] on the commercial social networking
[website] of friends or associates of the user that may be accessed by other users
or visitors to the [website].
(4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social networking [website]
mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat
room, electronic mail, or instant messenger. 148
The North Carolina legislature’s definition of social media includes many of
the commonalities and building blocks such as allowing users to create and share
content to build relationships, network, or establish a reputation. 149 Justice
Kennedy found provision (2) unconstitutionally overbroad under intermediate
scrutiny because it would restrict a “place” where people can communicate about
any subject that comes to mind.150
Justice Alito in concurrence noted provisions (1) and (4) were incredibly
broad and the statute as a whole precluded sites that were “unlikely to facilitate
the commission of a sex crime against a child.” 151 Justice Alito reasoned that
nearly all websites have advertising, so the first requirement does not limit the
statute’s reach in order to pass intermediate scrutiny by not limiting more speech
than necessary.152 Justice Alito further discussed that provision (4)—the site
allows users to communicate in ways like a message board—precluded websites
like Amazon and WebMD, which allow back-and-forth comments between
users.153
While the requirements are very broad, the statute has a limiting provision:
“commercial networking website” does not include a website that only provides
one service (photo-sharing, email, instant messenger, etc.) or the site’s primary
purpose is facilitating commercial transactions. 154 Therefore, the parties and
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(b)(1-4) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (modifications added).
149. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 746 (2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
150. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (“A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all
persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once
more.”)
151. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1740–41 (Alito, J., concurring).
152. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1740 (Alito, J., concurring).
153. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1741–42 (Alito, J., concurring).
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(c)(1-2) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (emphasis added).
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amicus briefs misled the Supreme Court Justices into believing Section 14-202.5
precluded sex offenders from accessing Amazon because Amazon is within the
primarily “popular retail website” exception, despite meeting the other statutory
qualifications.155
While the Court held the statute was too broad under intermediate scrutiny,
North Carolina’s definition of social media noted foundational characteristics and
limitations on what is not social media.156 The next section examines how other
legislatures define social media in order to narrow the definition of the model
statute to pass strict First Amendment scrutiny. 157
2. Other Legislative Definitions of Social Media
Some states define social media, but not for statutes restricting sex offenders
from accessing social media.158 These definitions are in statutes such as labor,
education, and administrative codes. 159 California uses the same definition of
social media in both its labor and education code: “an electronic service or
account, or electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, photographs,
blogs, podcasts, . . . or Internet Web site profiles or locations.” 160 Unlike North
Carolina, California gives examples of what users can do on social media sites,
but California does not mention any of the functions of these activities, like for
networking.161 While not explicit, all of the examples the California codes list are
examples of user-generated content—one of social media’s commonalities. 162
California’s examples could serve as a non-exhaustive list of user-generated
content examples for the model statute. 163
155. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1741–42 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14202.5(b).
156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(b) (defining “social media” to prohibit “access” to registered
sex offenders).
157. Infra Section III.B.2.
158. See CAL. EDUC . CODE § 99120 (West 2013); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a) (West 2014); 27 MISS.
ADMIN. CODE 27-110:7.5.11.2 (2018) and 27 MISS. ADMIN. CODE 27-120:5.15 (2018); NEV. ADMIN. CODE §
632.083 (2012) (defining social media for areas of law not involving registered sex offenders); but see N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a-b) (prohibiting sex offenders from using defined “commercial social networking
Web site[s]”).
159. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120; CAL. LAB . CODE § 980(a); 27 MISS. ADMIN. CODE 27-110:7.5.11.2 and
27 MISS . ADMIN. CODE 27-120:5.15; NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 632.083.
160. CAL. EDUC. C ODE § 99120; CAL. LAB . CODE § 980(a).
161. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120; CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a); see Jan Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get
Serious! Understanding the Functional Building Blocks of Social Media, 54 BUS. HORIZONS 241, 243 (2011)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the foundational building blocks of social
media).
162. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 746 (2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
163. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120; CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a) (“Examples of user-created social media
include, but are not limited to: videos, still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages,
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New York has a definition of social media within its penal code, and its
definition of “commercial social networking site” is textually similar to North
Carolina’s.164 New York immediately restricts the scope of its social media
definition to sites that allow people under 18 to become members. 165 This
restriction is proper given the law’s context, but the language does not actually
limit any of the popular social media sites because sites allow users as young as
13 years-old to sign up; even LinkedIn lets users as young as 16 register.166 The
wording would exclude dating applications because of age, such as Tinder. 167
However, dating sites do not share the social networking commonality present in
social media sites. 168
New York’s definition has the commonalities of user-generated content for
facilitating social development by establishing an identity and forming
relationships. 169 The New York definition could constrict what is a
“communication” among users by incorporating examples, like California does,
beyond instant messaging to narrowly tailor a model definition under strict
scrutiny.170
Mississippi defines social media in its administrative code as “various
activities that integrate technology, social interaction, and content creation.” 171
This definition, like New York’s, integrates the commonalities of content
creation for furthering social development. 172 Further, the Mississippi legislature
notes that individuals or groups can use social media to “create, organize, edit or
comment on, combine, and share content.” 173 Like California’s definition,
Mississippi provides different examples of online communications that could
email, online services or accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations.”).
164. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 2010) (“a website that permits persons under eighteen years
of age to be registered users for the purpose of establishing personal relationships with other users, where such
persons . . . may: (i) create web pages or profiles that provide information about themselves . . . available to the
public or to other users; (ii) engage in direct or real time communication with other users, such as a chat room
or instant messenger; and (iii) communicate with persons over eighteen years of age; . . . a commercial social
networking website shall not include a website that permits users to engage in such other activities as are not
enumerated herein”).
165. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(b).
166. Age Restrictions on Social Media Services, CHILDNET INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.childnet.com/blog/age-restrictions-on-social-media-services (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“[While] there is no age restriction for watching videos on YouTube, users need to be 13
or older to have their own YouTube account.”).
167. Tinder, Terms, https://www.gotinder.com/terms/us-2018-05-09 (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
168. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 747 (2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
169. Id. at 746.
170. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(b); see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120 (West 2013) (listing videos,
photographs, and blogs as some examples of communication on the Internet).
171. 27 MISS. ADMIN. CODE 27-110:7.5.11.2, 27-120:5.15 (2018).
172. Obar & Wildman, supra note 168, at 746.
173. 27 MISS. ADMIN. CODE 27-110:7.5.11.2, 27-120:5.15.
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form a non-exhaustive list of types of social media: “social-networking, blogs,
wikis, photo—sharing, video—sharing, podcasts, social bookmarking, mash-ups,
widgets, virtual worlds, microblogs, Really Simple Syndication (RSS) and
more.”174
Florida’s “Sexual Predators Act” 175 defines social media websites as,
“commercially operated Internet website[s] that allow [. . .] users to create web
pages or profiles that provide information about themselves and [. . .] that offers
a mechanism for communication with other users, such as a forum, chat room,
electronic mail, or instant messenger.” 176 The definition excludes website
communications when the primary purpose of the communication is for
commercial transactions of goods or services, the news, or with a governmental
entity. 177 Like North Carolina, Florida’s definition of social media excludes sites
that are not primarily for social networking. 178 Accordingly, a model statute
could also have a limiting provision to impose the least restrictive means.179
Nevada and Oklahoma also define social media. 180 Nevada’s administrative
code defines social media very generally: “any form of electronic communication
through which a person can create a community on the Internet to share
information, ideas, personal messages and other content.”181 The Nevada statute
maintains a very general definition that accounts for the “user-generated content”
and “networking” aspects of social media. 182 However, unlike New York or
North Carolina, Nevada does not have language limiting the scope of social
media based on the type of website or a user’s age. 183 Sites like Amazon or
WebMD—which, the Supreme Court thought North Carolina’s statute would
include—certainly fall within Nevada’s statute. 184 Therefore, the wording of
Nevada statute’s would likely be overbroad under any scrutiny because it is
broader than North Carolina’s, and the language should not be part of the model
174. Id.
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West 2018).
176. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(m) (referencing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0437(1) (West 2018)).
177. Id.
178. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(c) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(m)(1-3); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(c).
180. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 632.083 (2012); 40 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 173.2 (West 2018).
181. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 632.083.
182. Id.; see Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance
Challenge: An Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 745, 746–47 (2015) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the basic commonalities of user-generated content and
facilitation of social development of social media).
183. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(b) (McKinney 2010) (limiting social media to sites that permit
minors to register); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(c)(1-2) (excluding sites from its definition of
“social media” if it only provides one service or is primarily for facilitating commercial transactions).
184. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1741–42 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring)
(reasoning Amazon.com would be a prohibited website under North Carolina’s statute because it satisfied the
statutory definition of social media).
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statute’s language. 185
Oklahoma’s labor code, on the other hand, has a definition for a personal
online social media site: “[an] online account that is used by an employee . . .
exclusively for personal communications that an individual establishes and uses
through an electronic application, service or platform used to generate or store
content, including, but not limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs, video
blogs, instant messages, audio recordings or email[.]”186 Oklahoma’s definition
focuses on user-generated content that facilitates interactions like Mississippi’s
and New York’s.187 However, Oklahoma’s law pertains only to “personal
communications,” like emails and instant messaging which do not fully include
the commonality of user-generated content to facilitate social development and
form relationships.188 California and Mississippi also provide more exhaustive
and detailed examples of user-generated content that would be preferable to
Oklahoma’s examples for narrow tailoring. 189
C. Post-Packingham Developments
Since the United States Supreme Court decided Packingham, different courts
have used Packingham to determine issues related to free speech and cyberspace,
sex offender rights, or both.190 Some of these cases include United States v.
Rock,191 Doe v. Kentucky ex rel. Tilley,192 and Mason v. State.193
1. United States v. Rock
In Rock, Brandon Rock was in a romantic relationship with a woman who

185. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a-b) (limiting social media to sites that permit minors
to register); with NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 632.083 (2012) (defining social media generally as any form of
electronic communication).
186. 40 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 173.2 (West 2018).
187. 27 MISS. ADMIN. CODE 27-110:7.5.11.2, 27-120:5.15 (2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(b).
188. 40 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 173.2 (emphasis added); Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media
Definition and the Governance Challenge: An Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 746
(2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
189. 27 MISS. ADMIN. CODE 27-110:7.5.11.2, 27-120:5.15; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120 (West 2013);
CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a) (West 2014); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015)
(providing a law restricting speech must be narrowly tailored to serve governmental interests) (internal citations
omitted).
190. See United States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 95–96 (2nd Cir. 2019) (determining a ban on all Internet
websites was unconstitutional in light of Packingham) (emphasis in original); see also Valenti v. Lawson, 889
F.3d 427, 430–31 (7th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing Packingham and holding that banning registered sex offenders
from entering school property was constitutional, even though their local polling place was a school, because
numerous alternatives existed).
191. Infra Section III.C.1; United States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 831–32 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
192. Infra Section III.C.2; Doe v. Kentucky ex rel. Tilley, 283 F.Supp.3d 608, 612 (E.D. Ky. 2017).
193. Infra Section III.C.3; Mason v. State, 563 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2018).
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had an 11-year-old daughter.194 Rock put a hidden video camera in the girl’s
room and made still photographs from the videos of the girl completely nude. 195
“Rock entered an internet chat room where, unbeknownst to him, he began
communicating with undercover Metropolitan Police Department Detective
Timothy Palchak [who] was posing as an individual who had access to a fictional
12-year-old girl.”196 During the conversations, “Rock [additionally] expressed
interest in having sex with the fictional 12-year-old and openly solicited
Detective Palchak’s rape of the 12-year-old by offering to pay Palchak with more
images of child pornography if Palchak would let him watch the assault.” 197
After Rock plead guilty to distribution of child pornography, the district
court sentenced Rock to 172 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised
release. 198 Rock challenged a condition of his supervised release that prohibited
him from “possessing or using a computer, or having access to any online
service, without prior approval of the probation officer.”199 Rock contended that
condition, and others the district court imposed, were “not reasonably related to
his [offensive] conduct and involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary.”200
The D.C. Circuit distinguished Rock’s condition of release from Packingham
by reasoning that Rock’s condition was a reasonable deprivation of freedom for
an offender on probation while the statute in Packingham was a “post-custodial
restriction.”201 By “post-custodial” the Rock court meant that in Packingham, the
statute applied to all registered sex offenders once integrated back into society
after completing their sentence and probation. 202 The D.C. Circuit instead
determined Rock’s limited social media use was a condition of his individual
probation, and courts have the power to “impose reasonable conditions that
deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”203
2. Doe v. Kentucky ex rel. Tilley
A Kentucky district court declared a statute similar to the one at issue in
Packingham unconstitutional months after the Supreme Court’s decision. 204 John

194. Rock, 863 F.3d at 829.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 829, 831.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 831.
201. Id.
202. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1734, 1736 (2017) (emphasis added).
203. Rock, 863 F.3d at 829 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Knights 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001))
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)).
204. Doe v. Kentucky ex rel. Tilley, 283 F.Supp.3d 608, 612 (E.D. Ky. 2017).
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Doe “was convicted in 2007 of possessing child pornography . . . he is now
subject to the myriad provisions of Kentucky’s Sex Offender Registry Act.” 205
The particular provisions Doe and other offenders challenged dealt with
registered sex offenders’ social media use. 206 Regardless of the underlying
conduct mandating registration, registered sex offenders could not knowingly use
social networking sites, and the registration law required sex offenders to provide
all “email addresses, instant messaging names, or ‘other Internet communication
name identities.’”207
The language of Kentucky’s statute was comparable to North Carolina’s.208
However, a noticeable difference is that Kentucky’s law contained a mens rea
component: “No registrant shall knowingly or intentionally use a social
networking site.”209 Contrastingly, North Carolina’s made it unlawful to “access
a commercial social networking [site].” 210 Despite subtle differences between the
two laws, the district court concluded that the Kentucky law was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad similar to North Carolina’s. 211 Like
North Carolina’s law, Kentucky’s prohibited engaging in any speech on social
media—regardless of how innocent—and the court further determined the law
did not properly indicate what would be criminal conduct. 212
Basing its reasoning largely after Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Packingham,
the district court held that Kentucky’s ban on sex offenders from using social
media was unconstitutional. 213 While the district court declared the law
unconstitutional, the Kentucky legislature enacted an amended law in 2018. 214
Instead of outright banning of social media, the amended law significantly
narrows the scope of social media restrictions to communicating with or gather
information about a minor.215

205. Id. at 610.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 610–11.
208. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.546 (2013), declared unconstitutional by Doe v. Kentucky ex
rel. Tilley, 283 F.Supp.3d 608 (E.D. KY 2017), rev’d KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.546 (2018) (“No registrant
shall knowingly or intentionally use a social networking Web site or an instant messaging or chat room program
if that Web site or program allows a person who is less than eighteen (18) years of age to access or use the Web
site or program.”); with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (West 2009), declared unconstitutional by
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (“It is unlawful for a sex offender who is registered
[under North Carolina law] to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows
that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web pages on the
commercial social networking Web site.”).
209. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.546 (2013) (emphasis added).
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a).
211. Doe v. Kentucky ex rel. Tilley, 283 F.Supp.3d at 612–13.
212. Id. at 613.
213. Id. at 613, 615.
214. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.546 (West 2018).
215. Id.
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3. Mason v. State
Another recent case involved Kevin Mason, who had convictions for
sodomizing a minor and misdemeanor sexual misconduct. 216 Missouri law
required that Mason register as a sex offender and report “any ‘electronic mail
address and instant messaging screen name, user ID, cell phone number or
wireless communication device number or identifier, chat or other [I]nternet
communication name, or other identity information.’” 217 The motion court
charged Mason with the “class D felony of failure to register as a sex offender”
because he did not report his Facebook and email accounts. 218 Mason argued that
the statute requiring he register and provide information such as an email and
Facebook was unconstitutional.219 His main contention was that the United States
Supreme Court decided Packingham after his plea, and that the registry law is
unconstitutional in light of Packingham.220
The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed and reasoned Packingham was
factually distinguishable.221 The court drew the distinction on the scope of the
Missouri and North Carolina laws. 222 The court reasoned Packingham overruled
a law that was “unprecedented in scope” because it criminalized across-the-board
access to the Internet. 223 In contrast, Missouri’s law criminalized the “failure to
register” of specific online identifiers.224 Given this distinction, the Missouri
court turned to the Supreme Court’s language, which declared the First
Amendment permits enacting “specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex
offender from engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime.” 225
Overall, Packingham’s holding is limited to the determination that the North
Carolina law was unconstitutionally overbroad under intermediate scrutiny. 226 It
does not stand for the broad idea that everyone, including registered sex
offenders, holds a constitutional right to Facebook and social media under the
First Amendment.227 The ruling merely asserted that a specific and narrowlytailored law to prohibit registered sex offenders from social media is assumed
216. Mason v. State, 563 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2018).
217. Id. (citing MO. ANN. STAT. § 43.651.1(4) (West 2008)).
218. Mason, 563 S.W.3d at 168.
219. Id. at 170
220. Id. at 169–70.
221. Id. at 170–71.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 170 (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017)) (emphasis in
original).
224. Mason, 563 S.W.3d at 170 (emphasis in original).
225. Id. at 171 (citing Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737).
226. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737–38.
227. See Issie Lapowsky, The Supreme Court Just Protected Your Right to Facebook, WIRED, (June 19,
2017) https://www.wired.com/story/free-speech-facebook-supreme-court/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (titling article in a way that implies Facebook and social media are a right).
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constitutional under the First Amendment.228 A model statute’s definition of
“social media” can properly encompass the fundamental characteristics of social
media while borrowing language from various state definitions to satisfy strict
First Amendment scrutiny. 229 Further, model language defining social media will
consider and reflect court decisions after Packingham and not be an individual
condition of probation, add a mens rea component and determine what is
wrongful conduct, and limit more than mere “access” to social media sites.230 The
next section discusses physical locations that prohibit registered sex offenders
and determine their digital equivalents. 231
IV. PHYSICAL AND DIGITAL PROHIBITED LOCATIONS FOR SEX OFFENDERS
Various states have laws regulating the release and lives of registered sex
offenders.232 After registering as a sex offender, registry laws prohibit sex
offenders from certain locations such as schools or parks.233 These laws usually
prohibit how far a defender must live or stay away from a category of
locations.234 Many of the registration laws even prohibit registered sex offenders
from working or volunteering at schools or churches when children are
present.235 Additionally, some states prevent registered sex offenders from
participating in holiday events like giving candy on Halloween or dressing up as
Santa.236
Subsection A discusses characteristics of these locations and why laws exist
to prohibit registered sex offenders near playgrounds and schools. 237 Subsection
B analogizes these locations to social media sites to determine how to protect
children at the “digital playgrounds.” 238

228. Mason, 563 S.W.3d at 171 (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. at 1737).
229. See Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge:
An Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 745, 746–47 (2015) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the basic commonalities of social media); see also CAL. LAB . CODE §
980(a) (West 2014) (defining social media to include user-generated content, which is a commonality of social
media).
230. United States v. Rock, 863 F.3d 827, 829, 831–32 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Doe v. Kentucky ex rel. Tilley,
283 F.Supp.3d 608, 612, 613, 615 (E.D. KY 2017); Mason, 563 S.W.3d at 170–71.
231. Infra Part IV.
232. 720 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4.1 (b-c) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)–(c) (West
2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (West 2015).
233. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4.1; G A. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-9.3.
234. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4.1; G A. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-9.3.
235. 720 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4.1; G A. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(c); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/11-9.3.
236. 720 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3 (c-2).
237. Infra Section IV.A.
238. Infra Section IV.B.
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A. Common Restricted Areas for Registered Sex Offenders
The most common restrictions prohibit sex offenders from schools, parks,
and playgrounds. 239 These restrictions vary: some states prohibit sex offenders
from residing within “1000 feet of any child care facility, church, school, or area
where minors congregate.”240 Arkansas extends their restriction zone to 2000 feet
from those locations.241 Although Illinois does not impose as large of a
restriction, Illinois law prohibits sex offenders from knowingly being present in
public parks and knowing loitering within 500 feet of public parks. 242 Whether
these restrictions should remain constitutional is a policy consideration for
legislatures beyond the scope of this Comment. 243 Assuming the restrictions are
constitutional, equating digital social media sites to physical locations will
narrowly equate digital playgrounds to physical playgrounds. 244
Restrictions in some states prohibit sex offenders from certain locations and
“other places children congregate.”245 Under the interpretive canon of ejusdem
generis, “other places children congregate” means places similar to schools,
parks, or playgrounds. 246 These locations, which reasonably include playgrounds
and arcades, are public locations children can be without adult supervision and
exist primarily for minors to play and socialize.247
While parks and playgrounds may have been the primary locations for
children to congregate to play or socialize a generation ago, that is no longer
accurate, and sex offender prohibitions should reflect these changes. 248

239. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4.1 (b-c); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a)(1) (West 2015);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2) (West 2017) (setting out the
various prohibited locations under different registry laws).
240. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b).
241. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a)(1).
242. 720 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4.1 (b-c).
243. Ryan Hawkins, Human Zoning, The Constitutionality of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions as
Applied to Post-Conviction Offenders, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 331, 332–33 (2007) (noting the United Supreme Court
held registry laws constitutional, but states have begun enacting residency restrictions); see Andrew Bowen, San
Diego Sex Offender Registry Law Faces Uphill Legal Battle, KPBS (Aug. 8, 2017)
https://www.kpbs.org/news/2017/aug/08/san-diego-sex-offender-residency-law-faces-uphill-/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing San Diego law barring sex offenders living within 2,000 feet
of schools and the consequences of enforcing the restriction); see also Douglas Evans, Michelle Cubellis,
Coping with Stigma: How Registered Sex Offenders Manage Their Public Identities, AM . J. CRIM. JUST., 593,
594 (2015) available at https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs12103-014-9277-z.pdf (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing residency restrictions and other prohibitions that affect
lives of registered sex offenders).
244. Infra Section IV.B.
245. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0437(1) (West 2018).
246. Circuit City Store, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-115 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0437(1).
247. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134(a)(3), (a)(6) (West 2017).
248. See Danielle Taylor, Statistics of Play, NRPA (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.nrpa.org/parksrecreation-magazine/2012/august/statistics-of-play/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(suggesting congressional action in light of children spending less time outdoors than any other generation).
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According to a 2012 study, only 29 percent of high school students engaged in
the recommended 60 minutes of daily physical activity; children spent only 4–7
minutes having unstructured outdoor play.249 Instead, children aged 8 to 18
averaged 7.5 hours on entertainment media without accounting for multitasking,
which would make daily media use closer to 11 hours a day.250 Today, children
are more likely to congregate on screens and social media sites than at parks and
playgrounds.251
B. Digital Equivalents to Playgrounds
Given the prominence of social media in modern society—especially among
children and teens—sex offender prohibitions should reflect this shift in society
if the laws want to serve their purpose and prevent recidivism. 252 Some social
media platforms ban registered or convicted sex offenders in their terms of use,
which could make a model statute unnecessary because the site already imposes
restrictions.253 Other sites do not explicitly prevent sex offenders from joining,
but they prohibit users to join who are “barred by applicable law” in the United
States or other jurisdictions. 254 The model definition will not include sites that
249. Id. (emphasis added).
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. Tim Elmore, Parent’s Guide to Social Media Use for Kids, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/artificial-maturity/201803/parent-s-guide-social-media-use-kids (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736
(noting the prevalence of the Cyber Age); see also Danielle Taylor, Statistics of Play, NRPA (Aug. 1, 2012),
https://www.nrpa.org/parks-recreation-magazine/2012/august/statistics-of-play/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (describing the current generation of children’s reduction of outdoor play and amount
of time children spend using entertainment media).
252. See Roger Pryzbylski, Adult Sex Offender Recidivism, SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT
AND PLANNING INITIATIVE (Oct. 2014), https://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec1/ch5_recidivism.html#summary
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining child molesters are more likely than any
other type of offender to commit a crime against a child following release from prison and that overall rates of
recidivism may be underestimated).
253. Facebook, Terms of Service, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Snapchat, Snap Inc. Terms of Service,
https://www.snap.com/en-US/terms/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); Instagram, Terms of Use, https://help.instagram.com/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); Tinder, Terms, https://www.gotinder.com/terms/us-2018-05-09 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); YouTube, Policies and Safety,
https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/policies/#community-guidelines (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Twitter, Twitter User Agreement, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last
visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“You may not promote child
sexual exploitation . . . You may not direct abuse at someone by sending unwanted sexual content, objectifying
them in a sexually explicit manner, or otherwise engaging in sexual misconduct.”).
254. Twitter, Twitter User Agreement, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review); LinkedIn, User Agreement, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/useragreement (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Snapchat, Snap
Inc. Terms of Service, https://www.snap.com/en-US/terms/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); Twitch, Terms of Service, https://www.twitch.tv/p/legal/terms-ofservice/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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explicitly ban registered sex offenders. 255 However, the model definition of social
media will include popular sites among children and sites where users can
communicate and develop relationships on the platform.256
The “digital playgrounds” of the Internet should include websites where
children congregate, meaning popular websites among children. 257 The sites will
be ones where children can create their own profiles and post user-generated
content to socialize and communicate with a network of other users on the
website.258 Since popular social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
Snapchat, LinkedIn, and YouTube already restrict registered sex offenders, other
websites are the target of the model statute. 259
The Texas Health and Safety Code makes arcades a drug-free zone, and
given arcades are popular places where children congregate—at least, they were
in the past—the model statute should also aim to prevent registered sex offenders
from accessing digital arcades. 260 To narrow the scope of the model statute, the
gaming site should require that users be able to communicate with each other to
simulate a real arcade or playground. 261
Social media and the Internet are the digital playgrounds where children are
more likely to “congregate;” meaning they will sign up or become members of
these sites.262 The model statute would exclude sites that explicitly prohibit sex
offenders—a real-life example would be a private playground—which are
websites like YouTube, Twitter, and Snapchat that are popular among
children. 263 There are also many gaming sites children are likely to use that a
model statute should regulate because they satisfy the fundamental characteristics
of social media.264 The next part describes ways to restrict these digital
255. See Facebook, Terms of Service, supra note 253 (“[b]ut you cannot use Facebook if: . . . You are a
convicted sex offender.”); see also Jan Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the
Functional Building Blocks of Social Media, 54 BUS. HORIZONS 241, 245 (2011) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how YouTube took action to avoid copyright violations and hosting
offensive content).
256. See Kietzmann, supra note 255 (explaining that sharing content can lead to communication and
forming relationships among users).
257. See Danielle Taylor, Statistics of Play, NRPA (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.nrpa.org/parksrecreation-magazine/2012/august/statistics-of-play/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining that a smaller proportion of children engage in outdoor play and spend significant amounts of time
online).
258. Kietzmann, supra note 255, at 241–42.
259. Facebook, Terms of Service, supra note 253; Instagram, Terms of Use, https://help.instagram.com/
(last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Tinder, Terms,
https://www.gotinder.com/terms/us-2018-05-09 (last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (prohibiting registered sex offenders from registering an account with these websites).
260. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134(a)(6) (West 2017).
261. Kietzmann, supra note 255, at 246.
262. Id. at 242; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.134(a)(3).
263. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015: Smartphone Facilitate Shifts
in Communication Landscape for Teens, PEW RES. CTR. 25 (Apr. 9, 2015).
264. Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An
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playgrounds and provide the wording for the model definition of social media. 265
V. RESTRICTING THE DIGITAL PLAYGROUNDS
A law restricting registered sex offenders on social media is content-based
because it aims to prevent unwanted sexual solicitations or messages that
“presage a sexual crime,” because of its speaker, a registered sex offender. 266
Such law should be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling purpose in the least
restrictive manner to pass strict scrutiny. 267 The model statute’s prohibited
activities must be narrower than “accessing certain websites” like North
Carolina’s law, and instead, should be more like Illinois’ law: unlawful to use the
Internet to knowingly communicate with minors, except for lawful purposes, or if
the offender is talking with the offender’s own minor child. 268 The prohibited
activities should also consider the language in Packingham: “conduct that often
presages a sexual crime[.]”269 However, registry laws in most states that prohibit
certain locations do not list prohibited activities if a sex offender is in a park or
playground; they simply cannot be within the specified range. 270 Therefore, the
model statute in the subsequent section contains a section about activities as a
place holder because the main focus of this Comment’s model statute is to
narrowly tailor the definition of social media. 271
The North Carolina statute at issue in Packingham made it “unlawful for a
registered sex offender to access a social networking [site]” as the statute later
defined. 272 Violating the North Carolina statute was a felony offense for doing
something as simple as visiting a website. 273 Not only did this statute broadly
define social media, it was too restrictive of the prohibited behavior; essentially,
Introduction to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 747 (2015) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
265. Infra Part V.
266. Reed v. Town of Gilbert., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct.
1730, 1737 (2017) (“[I]t can be assumed that the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly
tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like
contacting a minor or using a website to gather information about a minor.”).
267. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
268. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (West 2009) (“It is unlawful for a sex offender who is
registered [under North Carolina law] to access a commercial social networking Web site”) (emphasis added);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3 (b-20) (West 2018) (“[I]t is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly
communicate. . . using the Internet or other digital media with a person under 18.”) (emphasis added).
269. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
270. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0437(1) (West 2018) (Restricting sex offenders from residing within
1000 feet of a school, park, playground, or “other place where children congregate.”); see also 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.4.1 (b-c) (prohibiting knowing presence in a public park or knowing loitering within 500
feet of a public park).
271. Infra Part V(a).
272. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (emphasis added).
273. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(e); see Vangie Beal, Access Definition, Webopedia (2019),
https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/A/access.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(defining “access” as visiting a website).
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accidentally clicking something that opens a Facebook or Twitter page was
forbidden. 274 Therefore, a model statute must not only narrowly tailor its
definition of social media, but also prohibit certain behaviors in the least
restrictive way possible. 275 This Comment only addresses the scope of what is
social media, but model language should restrict prohibited behaviors beyond
merely “accessing” a particular site.276
Illinois law prohibits registered sex offenders from the Internet or social
media like North Carolina.277 Illinois law does not mention social media, but
provides that “[i]t is unlawful for a child sex offender to knowingly communicate
. . . using the Internet or other digital media with a person under 18.”278 There are
exceptions if there is a “lawful purpose under Illinois law,” or the sex offender is
a parent or guardian of a minor.279 Prescribing a certain state of mind narrows the
law towards the least restrictive means by making a person guilty if they act at
the specified level of culpability with regard to the required elements of the
crime. 280
Based on the discussion of social media and how to survive a First
Amendment challenge, this Comment proposes the following as a model statute
to prohibit registered sex offenders from using social media:
(a) It shall be unlawful for a registered sex offender to knowingly use,
register for, or otherwise utilize “social media” to contact a minor, collect
information regarding a minor, or conduct any other acts in the commission of a
sexual crime. 281
(b) “Social media” for the purposes of this section must meet all of the
following requirements:
(1) An Internet website or mobile application;282

274. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736–37; Beal, supra note 273.
275. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (prohibiting “access” to commercial networking sites,
which the statute later defines); but see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3 (b-20) (West 2018) (“it is unlawful
for a child sex offender to knowingly communicate. . . using the Internet or other digital media with a person
under 18.”) (emphasis added).
277. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a); 720 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3 (b-20).
278. 720 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.3 (b-20).
279. Id.
280. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Am. Law Inst., Current through 2017 meeting) (“[A] person is
not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require,
with respect to each material element of the offense.”).
281. Doe v. Kentucky ex rel. Tilley, 283 F.Supp.3d 608, 612–15 (E.D. KY 2017); see Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (explaining that the First Amendment would permit a statute that
prohibited activities that “presage” a sexual crime); this clause is only serving as an example for drafting
purposes. A fully drafted provision would want to consider the activities that most often presage a sexual crime
beyond acces, and how other legislatures punish or define that behavior.
282. This speaks to the commonality that social media is a Web 2.0 application. While it is broad, it is a
basic requirement to be a social media. Further, the requirements are an “and” test, so each qualifier is required.
Jonathan A. Obar & Steve Wildman, Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An Introduction
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(2) Allows users to create personal, media-specific, profiles that contain
information such as the name, nickname, the user’s interests, or other personal
information about the user, and links to other user’s personal profiles or
webpages on the site or application for the purposes of friendship, meeting other
persons, or information exchange; 283
(3) Facilitates the social interaction and development between two or more
users on the site through videos, still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts,
instant and text messaging, email, or other digital forms of communication; 284
and
(4) Exists primarily to facilitate networking, conversation, or sharing of
various forms of interaction as noted in subsection (3). 285
(c) “Social media” does not include an Internet site or mobile application that
primarily exists to do any of the following:
(1) Facilitate transactions for the sale of goods or services;
(2) Disseminates news; or
(3) Communicate with a governmental entity. 286
(d) A violation of this section shall be punishable as a felony.287
VI. CONCLUSION
With the Supreme Court’s decision in Packingham and the presence of social
media in modern society, state legislatures looking to protect children from
online predation should consider the narrowly-tailored model definition of social

to the Special Issue, 39 TELECOMM. POL’ Y 745, 746–47 (2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
283. This provision incorporates the remaining commonalities like user-generated content and some of
the foundational building blocks like identity formation or sharing. Jan Kietzmann et al., Social Media? Get
Serious! Understanding the Functional Building Blocks of Social Media, 54 BUS. HORIZONS 241, 243 (2011)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Obar & Wildman, supra note 282.
284. This qualification includes the interactive features of social media and draws from some of the
statutory provisions that provide examples of various communicative forms or features in social media that
make social media social mediums. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120 (West 2013); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a) (West
2014).
285. This is a final qualifier to narrow social media to its primary purpose: socializing. This draws from
the North Carolina limiting provision, and other jurisdictions have similar provisions that narrow social media
to foundationally social mediums. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(b)(1-4), (c) (West 2009), declared
unconstitutional by Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017); Obar & Wildman, supra note 282,
at 747.
286. Sections (1) through (3) again serve as limiting provisions. North Carolina had a provision such as
this to exclude websites that were primarily for news or conducting transactions. Here, social media must satisfy
all four requirements, but any one of the three provisions can exclude a website from consideration as a “social
media.” These three exceptions are based on other statutory definitions of social media and due to the reduced
likelihood children will visit sites of the nature of these exceptions. Additionally, these sites allow registered sex
offenders a chance to use technology for utility and convenience to do things like buy goods, pay bills, or
receive the news. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(m)(1-3) (West 2018).
287. Different jurisdictions generally consider violating the prohibition a felony offense. Legislatures are
free to choose the desired punishment. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(e).
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media if they want the law to change with society.288 The model definition
accounts for the Supreme Court’s reasoning and language of different state
legislatures as a way to narrow the gap between what the law says and how
society is. 289 The model definition of social media aims to further the
government’s interest in protecting children from online predation while also
conforming to the scrutiny of the First Amendment. 290

288. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“[T]he statute here enacts a
prohibition unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it burdens.”).
289. See Danielle Taylor, Statistics of Play, NRPA (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.nrpa.org/parksrecreation-magazine/2012/august/statistics-of-play/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(explaining the prominence of entertainment media among children).
290. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
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